“Respecting another kind of bribe, Benedict Stattler expresses himself in the following words (vol. i. of his Moral Ethics, p. 460): ‘When, on account of the selfishness and factiousness of the higher authorities, there is no way left open to our obtaining public offices by our own merit and our own worth, it is not only allowable, but, indeed, serviceable, from the motive of the love of God and of our neighbour, to obtain by presents or flattery the favour of those who have it in their power to bestow these offices.’”
Small wonder, then, that so many men and women rise to positions of high authority in governments by bribery and flattery, men and women who have no true abilities for the office they hold, but ways and means of buying their positions. Numerous examples could be produced from all over the world.
“For there is no faithfulness in their mouth; their inward part is very wickedness; their throat is an open sepulchre; they flatter with their tongue” (Psa. 5:9); “For neither at any time used we flattering words, as ye know” (1 Thess. 2:5).
Abortion (Yes, abortion!)
“Abortion?” we can hear many say, incredulously. “Surely no Roman Catholic has ever taught that abortion is ever acceptable! Why, the Roman Catholic religion is well known for its strong opposition to abortion!”
No; this is not, in fact, so. Rome “officially” opposes abortion, certainly. But when there is something to be gained by it, she does not oppose it. And the Jesuits are masters at teaching one thing for public consumption, but quite another thing to those whom they feel are in need of being taught something else. Listen to their wickedness on this subject:
“The getting rid of an immature child is likewise considered to be allowable by the sons of Loyola, at least in certain cases, which, however, are of a very flexible character, and Father Airaut writes regarding this (Proposition sur le Cinquième Precepte du Decalogue, p. 322): ‘One asks whether a woman may make use of means to obtain abortion. I answer, Yes, if quickening has not taken place, and the pregnancy is not dangerous. But even if there has been quickening already, it may be effected as soon as a conviction is arrived at that she must die by the birth. Under all circumstances, however, a young person who has been led astray may do so, as her honour must be to her more precious than the life of the child.’ Assuredly very peculiar morality!”
Very peculiar indeed, given Rome’s very public stance against abortion. But there it is: for all her talk about a baby being a human being from the moment of conception (as indeed it is, biblically: Psa. 139:13-16; Lk. 1:15,36,41-44, etc.), she has in her midst the most powerful and influential of her priests and teachers, the Jesuits, whose own theologians have stated that it is perfectly right and proper to murder one person (the child) to save another (the mother), or even to murder a child in its mother’s womb if this will preserve the honour of the girl. “Honour is more precious than human life!” So then, it becomes obvious that there must have been many Roman Catholic girls and women, especially those married to an influential man of whom Rome expected much, or those holding influential positions themselves, who have confessed their sin to some Jesuit priest and who have been told to have an abortion, rather than to stain their reputations or that of their husbands.
All Rome’s supposed opposition to abortion on moral grounds is worthless, when she harbours in her midst a society of men, the sons of Loyola, who permit abortion whenever it suits their purposes!
This also explains certain comments by the pope of Rome, Francis I – a member of the Jesuit Order! – who at times took a decidedly less rigid stance against abortion than his papal predecessors, playing down Rome’s official teaching on abortion when he felt the need to, and had to backtrack and attempt to explain away his comments when he came under fire for them.
“Liguori maintains that one may commit a minor crime in order to avoid a greater crime. He says: ‘Hence Sanchez teaches, etc., that it is lawful to persuade a man, determined to slay some one, that he should commit theft or fornication’ [Moral Theology, tom. ii. lib. iii. cap. ii. n. 57, p. 157. Mech. 1845].”
Let us try to get our heads around such “morality”. A friend comes to me and says, “I am planning to murder so-and-so. He did wrong to me and I must kill him.” “No, no, don’t do that!” I beg him. “Murder is a great sin. Don’t become guilty of it. Listen, I have an idea. Direct your anger towards a lesser sin. Go to the man’s house, and steal his possessions; or even, if you like, just go and sleep with some woman – that’s a lesser sin as well. Just don’t commit murder!”
No; try as we might, we cannot get our heads around it, for there is no amount of mental gymnastics, no amount of moral wriggling and squirming, which can possibly support this kind of Jesuit wickedness, put forward, with all the brazenness with which only the Jesuits are capable, as “moral theology”.
Here follows “the manner in which Father Gobat expresses himself in his Oeuvres Morales (tome ii., p.228), regarding crime committed during drunkenness, and even in the case of parricide. After coming to the most sophistical and fallacious conclusion that a drunkard cannot be made responsible for his actions, he concludes as follows: ‘A son who has become intoxicated, and in this state has killed his father, is not merely no criminal, but he may rejoice, indeed, at the circumstances of the murder which he has committed, if, that is, a great fortune which he inherits is in question, as large riches belong in every way to those things much to be desired, especially when one understands how to make good use of them.’”
This is a truly hideous doctrine. Let us look at it more closely:
A drunkard cannot be responsible for his actions, says the Jesuit. And is this not how the judicial systems of the western world now function? They have imbibed this terrible Jesuit doctrine! In courts everywhere today, when a crime has been committed while drunk, this is considered a “mitigating factor”, an “extenuating circumstance”. It should be considered an aggravating factor! For two crimes have been committed: the crime of getting drunk, and then whatever crime was committed while drunk. But no; today, when a man commits a crime while drunk, he is considered to have “diminished responsibility”; or “not to be responsible for his actions”. What kind of insanity is this? It is Jesuit insanity, plain and simple. And it has infected the West’s judicial systems.
“An intoxicated son who kills his father is not a criminal.” This same Jesuit, however, who says the son who murders his father while drunk is no criminal, calls what the son has done “murder” in the very same sentence! If then it is murder, then the son is a murderer, and murder is a crime; how can he not then be a criminal? Only a Jesuit would attempt to defend what is utterly indefensible.
By implication, also, if murdering one’s own father while drunk is not a crime, then whatever evil one does while drunk, it is not a crime. If a drunken man beats up his wife – he is not responsible, he cannot be a criminal! If while drunk a man gets behind the wheel of a car and causes an accident which kills others – he is not responsible, and cannot be culpable! What if a drunken man beats his own child to death? Doubtless the Jesuit would say it is not criminal – if some advantage could be obtained by it.
For this is what he says next: “he may rejoice if he inherits a great fortune by killing his father while drunk”! And on what grounds does he say this? “Large riches are much to be desired!” Never mind that the Lord Jesus Christ had so much to teach about the dangers of riches, and the desire for them (Matt. 6:19-21,24). Never mind that Paul says, “And having food and raiment let us be therewith content. But they that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the love of money is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows” (1 Tim. 6:8-10). What do the Jesuits care about what God’s Word says? They teach the exact opposite, and do so without flinching.
“Self-Defence” by Means of Lies and Murder
“The sons of Loyola maintain that one is fully entitled to make use of the sharpest ‘reprisals against anyone by whom one may have been insulted, and not merely by means of judicial complaint, but by retaliation, and, before everything, by detraction and calumny, to deprive such person of his honour and good repute. In regard to the latter (detraction of honour and calumny), one may be certain,’ says Tamburin in his Decalogus (lib. ix. cap. ii. 2), ‘that a number of people will soon be found who will swear to the calumny, as, naturally, men have much desire for wickedness, and thus the person insulting always falls into greater disgrace, until at length every one points a finger at him.’ Hermann Busenbaum expresses himself somewhat more circumspectly (Christian Theology, book iii. part vi. chap. I) when he writes: ‘In the case of anyone unjustifiably making an attack on your honour, when you cannot otherwise defend yourself than by impeaching the integrity of the person insulting you, it is quite allowable to do so. You must, however, tell the truth, and not carry the thing further than is required for the maintenance of your own reputation, while no greater insult must be inflicted on the person than has befallen yourself, an exact comparison being made between your own worth and that of your insulter.’ Leonard Lessius expresses himself far more freely (lib. ii. De Anst. cap. 2), as he teaches thus: ‘Has anyone made an attack on your honour, you may then at once make use of retaliation, and you have thereby nothing else to observe than to keep up a comparison as much as possible.’ The language of Benedict Stattler is, however, the most severe, and at the same time the most clear, when he makes use of the following words: ‘It is still more allowable in this case (namely, when one is injured ignominiously) to bring the calumniator to universal notice by a disclosure of his secret transgressions or crimes, by which means people may change their opinion as to his injurious imputations. Also to attribute a false crime to the calumniator is allowable for such an object, if this should be the only sufficient, indispensable, or even serviceable means to deprive him of all belief and credit for his calumniation.’”